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To what extent does language shape how we think about the world? Studies suggest that 
linguistic symbols expressing conceptual categories ("apple", "squirrel") make us focus on 
categorical information (e.g., that you saw a squirrel) and disregard individual information (e.g., 
whether that squirrel had a long or short tail). Across two experiments with preverbal infants, we 
demonstrated that it is not language but nonverbal category knowledge that determines what 
information is packed into object representations. Twelve-month-olds (N = 48) participated in an 
EEG change-detection task involving objects undergoing a brief occlusion. When viewing objects 
from unfamiliar categories, infants detected both across- and within-category changes, as 
indicated by their Nc event-related potential. Conversely, when viewing objects from familiar 
categories, they did not respond to within-category changes, which indicates that nonverbal 
category knowledge interfered with the representation of individual features necessary to detect 
such changes. Furthermore, distinct patterns of gamma and alpha oscillations between familiar 
and unfamiliar categories were evident before and during occlusion, suggesting that 
categorization had an influence on the format of recruited object representations. Thus, we show 
that nonverbal category knowledge has rapid and enduring effects on object representation and 
discuss their functional significance for generic knowledge acquisition in the absence of 
language. 
 





We filter experience through knowledge about the world such that we cannot help recognizing 
things around us as tomatoes or apples, pens or pencils, cars or computers (Grill-Spector & 
Kanwisher, 2005). This structuring of perceptual input through abstract semantic categories bears 
heavily on the way we represent and remember encountered objects. Categorical identity takes 
priority over featural information in visual processing: it is easier to discriminate objects drawn 
from distinct categories than from the same category even when the visual distance between the 
items to compare is matched (e.g., B – p are easier to tell apart than B – b, Lupyan, 2008a; Lupyan 
& Spivey, 2008; Lupyan, Thomson-Schill, & Swingley, 2010). Categorical information (e.g., 
whether one saw a lamp or a chair) is also easier to recall than individual information (e.g., 
which particular lamp was seen), whether from short- or long-term memory (Brady et al., 2008, 
2009; Lupyan, 2008b).  
Developmental studies indicate that categorization starts to influence object 
representation already during the first year of life. Like adults, infants privilege category over 
featural information when individuating objects and storing them in working memory (Kibbe & 
Leslie, 2019; Bonatti et al., 2002; Surian & Caldi, 2010; Xu, Carey, & Quint, 2004; Feigenson & 
Halberda, 2008; Stavans et al., 2019) even though they are capable of encoding visual features 
such as shape, size, pattern and color (Wilcox, 1999). To date, however, the origins of biases 
prioritizing categorical information at the expense of individual features remain unclear despite 
their apparent continuity throughout the lifespan. 
According to one influential tradition, categorical information holds a special role in 
object representation because of language that guides category learning (Perszyk & Waxman, 
2018; Carey, 2009). As early as 3 months of age, infants form abstract visual categories by 
extracting commonalities among disparate individuals named in the same way (Ferry, Hespos, & 
Waxman, 2010), and language continues to facilitate the discovery of new categories into 
adulthood (Zettersten & Lupyan, 2020). In addition, both adults (Meyer et al., 2007) and children 
(Mani & Plunkett, 2010) tend to retrieve category labels (e.g., "apple", "cat") upon seeing familiar 
objects. As a result, some suggested that top-down influences from lexical-semantic 
representations to higher-level visual areas bring out the categorical features of perceived objects, 
inducing biases in perception and memory (Lupyan, 2012). Biases may also result from the fact 
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that words are held in memory instead of visual representations (Xu, 1999, 2002, 2007; Needham 
& Baillargeon, 2000). Indeed, in adults, when lexical access is prevented through verbal 
interference, the advantages for encoding category information become attenuated (Roberson & 
Davidoff, 2000; Winawer et al., 2007).  
 However, language itself builds on pre-existing conceptual representations that become 
word meanings in the course of language acquisition (Macnamara, 1982; Nelson, 1974; Mandler, 
2004). Infants map novel labels not onto the particular objects they experience being named but 
directly onto prelinguistic concepts and categories that these objects exemplify (Pomiechowska & 
Gliga, 2019; Yin & Csibra, 2015). Critically, for such mappings to take place, learners need to be 
equipped with prelinguistic representational capacities that make conceptual category 
information stand out before linguistic representations become available (Csibra & 
Shamsudheen, 2015). This opens the possibility that nonverbal knowledge structures that 
predate language may be responsible for the prioritization of categorical information in object 
representation.  
Does the priority of categorical information in object representation reflect biases 
stemming from language or from non-linguistic concepts and categories? The available 
experimental evidence cannot adjudicate between these two possibilities because it comes 
predominantly from studies that used lexicalized categories, thus leaving unanswered whether 
categorical biases generalize to nonlexicalized categories. Besides, comparing the effects of 
lexicalized and nonlexicalized categories in adults is problematic because of our tendency to 
spontaneously label unfamiliar objects involved in the task at hand (Lupyan & Spivey, 2008). 
Data from preverbal infants could provide insight into the origins of categorical biases, but the 
available experimental work investigating infant object cognition has not systematically 
controlled for the contributions of infant lexical knowledge, shown to be operational as early as 6 
to 9 months of age (Bergelson & Swingley, 2012; Parise & Csibra, 2012). 
Using a novel change-detection task in a population of 12-month-olds, the present study 
investigated whether nonverbal categories can modify how object representations are set up in 
the absence of language.  We employed electroencephalography (EEG) to assess two related 
issues. First, we enquired whether newly taught nonverbal category knowledge could bias 
infants to focus on categorical features of viewed items and give up representing their individual 
features. To probe what information infants encode, we compared their neural responses to two 
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types of object changes occurring after a short occlusion of a probe item: within-category changes 
(e.g., a watering can changing into another watering can) and across-category changes (e.g., a 
watering can changing into a padlock). While across-category changes can be detected based on 
categorical information only, the detection of within-category changes requires the storage of 
individual features. Thus, if nonverbal category knowledge enhances the representation of 
categorical attributes at the expense of individual detail, this should be reflected in the infants' 
sensitivity to object changes: namely, they should manifest higher sensitivity to across- than 
within-category changes.  
To assess change detection performance, we measured the negative central wave (Nc) in 
response to object reappearance. The Nc is an event-related component observed in the infant 
EEG at frontocentral sites following modifications in stimulus appearance, reflecting allocation of 
attention (Courchesne (1997); Webb, Long, & Nelson (2005); Reynolds & Richards (2005); 
Richards (2003); for a review, Coch & Gullick, 2012). Hence, differences in Nc amplitudes 
between conditions would indicate differences in the infants' attentional engagement. In our 
design the only aspect of the stimulus that varied across conditions and could modulate infants’ 
attention was the identity of the object revealed after occlusion. Therefore, we reasoned that the 
Nc component would index the sensitivity to different object changes (i.e., with larger 
amplitudes diagnostic of larger sensitivity) and provide a window into the contents of the 
underlying object representations. To verify that the observed patterns of results were brought 
about by category knowledge and would not arise spontaneously in the absence thereof, we 
contrasted infants' responses to objects from familiar and unfamiliar categories.  
Second, we sought to evaluate whether nonverbal categorization affected the format of 
representations recruited by the infants and shed light on the time course with which this 
process may occur. For example, one possibility is that, upon categorization, infants have 
accessed and stored a nonverbal symbol corresponding to the category of a viewed object 
(Pomiechowska et al., in press; Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015). Alternatively, categorization may 
only have affected the selection of visual features infants encoded and retained in memory (e.g., 
category-diagnostic features vs. a random selection of features including category-diagnostic 
features and other features irrelevant for categorization). These changes could occur already 
upon visual inspection of the objects or, only later, when the objects became occluded. To inquire 
whether categorization might be triggering a representational change, we investigated induced 
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oscillatory activity before object reappearance. Previous infancy work revealed that induced 
gamma oscillations over temporal cortices exhibit higher synchrony during a visual inspection of 
familiar compared to unfamiliar categories (Gliga, Volein, & Csibra, 2010), which was interpreted 
as an index of conceptual access. We sought to replicate this pattern of findings. However, scalp-
recorded gamma activation may reflect differences in eye-movements rather than in neural 
representations (Yuval-Greenberg et al., 2008; Hassler, Barreto, & Gruber, 2011). We, therefore, 
chose to additionally investigate another neural marker, alpha-band oscillations, widely linked to 
the maintenance of sensory information in working memory (for a review, de Vries, Slagter, & 
Olivers, 2019). We posited that if posterior alpha suppression during occlusion is manifest only 
for unfamiliar categories, this would indicate that distinct representational formats might have 
been recruited, with unfamiliar-category objects represented by their features actively 
maintained in the ventral visual stream and familiar-category objects potentially represented in a 
categorical or conceptual symbolic manner with lesser involvement of ventral visual cortices 
(Freedman et al., 2001; 2003). 
We carried out two experiments. To validate our design, in Experiment 1, we sought to 
confirm that our EEG paradigm is sensitive to the existence of categorical biases in object 
representation, thus replicating prior behavioral findings. We tested whether infants would 
prioritize categorical over individual information when tracking through occlusion objects from 
real-world categories: familiar, acquired before the lab visit, and unfamiliar. This design 
capitalized on the conceptual repertoire that infants develop during the first year of life, which 
partly overlaps with their receptive lexicon (Bergelson & Swingley, 2012; Parise & Csibra, 2012), 
therefore leaving open the possibility that the observed effects might be due to early linguistic 
experience. To rule this out and directly assess the role of nonverbal category knowledge, in 
Experiment 2, we investigated strictly nonverbal categories taught during the experimental 
session. By introducing novel categories in the lab, we ensured that infants did not know their 








2. Experiment 1 
 




Data were obtained from 24 healthy 12-month-olds from monolingual English-speaking homes: 
12 infants participated in the familiar-category condition (5 females, mean age = 12.76 mo, range: 
12.38 to 13.03 mo) and 12 in the unfamiliar-category condition (7 females, mean age = 12.66 mo, 
range: 12.23 to 13.06 mo). The current sample size was determined a priori based on the literature 
(Grossman et al., 2009; Richards, 2003; Gliga, Volein, & Csibra, 2010; Southgate & Begus, 2013). 
Within-subject comparisons of mean Nc amplitudes yield very large effect sizes (d > 1.20, 
Grossman et al., 2009). Hence, using power analysis in G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) we 
estimated that testing 12 participants per condition would be sufficient to provide 80% statistical 
power to detect a large effect size (d = 0.80) on the Nc responses using a paired-samples t test 
(one-sided) and an alpha of .05. Note also that in across-experiment comparisons the sample size 
for each category (familiar v. unfamiliar) raises to 24, therefore providing 95% statistical power to 
detect a large effect size using a two-sided test. Another 18 infants were tested but not included 
in the analysis because of fussiness (n = 4) or excessive movement resulting in an insufficient 
number of artifact-free trials (n = 14). This attrition rate conforms to prior work in infant 
electrophysiology (Kaufman, Csibra, & Johnson, 2005; Southgate et al., 2008; Quinn, Westerlund, 
& Nelson, 2006). Families were recruited through advertising in local magazines. Before the 
experimental session, all caregivers gave written informed consent. Families' travel expenses 




In the familiar-category condition, we used 6 object kinds whose names were previously shown 
to be comprehended by 12-month-olds growing up in monolingual English-speaking families 
(for questionnaire evidence, Dale & Fenson, 1996; Frank et al., in press; for experimental 
evidence: e.g., Bergelson & Swingley, 2012): BALL, BOTTLE, CAR, DUCK, SHOE, TEDDY BEAR. 
Caregivers confirmed the familiarity with the category labels in the current sample through the 
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MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory: Words and Gestures (Fenson, 2002) 
(Fenson et al., 1994). Average comprehension scores ranged from 65% to 95% (ball: 95%, bottle: 
83%, car: 91%, duck: 78%, shoe: 84%, teddy bear: 65%). In the unfamiliar-category condition, we 
used 6 objects whose kinds and labels were unknown to the infants: FEATHER, GUITAR, 
HEDGEHOG, PADLOCK, STAPLER, WATERING CAN. Parents were shown the stimuli before the EEG 
session and confirmed that infants were not familiar with any of the target categories.  
Visual stimuli in the EEG task were temporarily occluded color photographs of real-
world objects. For each object kind, we used photographs of three different items. Whenever 
possible, we chose items of different color, orientation, and shape to maximize within-category 
variability.  
Our stimuli are freely available in the following OSF repository: https://osf.io/b36cg/. 
 
2.1.3. Design and Procedure 
 
Infants watched animations depicting objects presented against a white background and briefly 
occluded by a vertically moving screen. Each trial began with an empty stage (300-550 ms). Then, 
an object (e.g., duck A) slid onto a table (300 ms) and remained in full view (1000 ms) before 
disappearing behind a rising screen (350 ms). The screen hid the object for 1000-1250 ms 
(randomly determined) and then went down (350 ms), revealing one of the three possible 
outcomes: either the same object that was occluded (e.g., duck A on no-change trials), or another 
exemplar of the same category (e.g., duck B on within-category change trials), or an exemplar of 
a different category (e.g., shoe on across-category change trials). The object briefly stayed in full 
view (1000 ms) before sliding down behind the stage (300 ms). The three conditions (no change, 
within-category change, across-category change) were presented with the same frequency (i.e., 
on one-third of all trials each). The order of the presentation was pseudorandomized, as no more 
than two trials from the same condition could appear in succession. The trials were presented in 
silence, only the object sliding up on the stage was indicated by a short jingle (200 ms, randomly 
selected from a set of three sounds) whose onset was timed to the first frame in which the object 
became visible. Infants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions: familiar-category 
condition involving tokens of object categories familiar to them (BALL, BOTTLE, CAR, DUCK, SHOE, 
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TEDDY BEAR) and unfamiliar-category condition involving tokens of unfamiliar object categories 
(FEATHER, GUITAR, HEDGEHOG, PADLOCK, STAPLER, WATERING CAN). 
Infants were seated on their caregivers' lap in a dimly lit, electrically-shielded, and sound-
proofed room. Caregivers were instructed not to name the stimuli. After fitting the EEG cap, the 
experimenter pointed to the stimulus screen and talked briefly to the infant, while an attention-
getter animation was displayed (i.e., flowers opening up to the sound of ambient music), then 
left the room. The data collection was carried out for as long as the infants were willing to 
participate. The experimenter occasionally called the infant's name through a loudspeaker and 
praised her for attending to the stimuli (e.g., "Hi INFANT'S NAME! You're doing a great job. Look 
at these. Wow! What are they?"). If the experimenter judged necessary to redirect infants' 
attention back to the stimuli presentation, an attention-getter clip (i.e., a young woman saying 
"Hello baby!" while waving to the infant) was played. The study protocol was prepared in 
compliance with relevant ethical regulations and approved by the ethical commission of 
Birkbeck College, University of London. 
MATLAB (7.10.0.499) and Psychophysics Toolbox (3.0.8) were used for stimuli 
randomization and presentation. Stimuli (800 x 600 pixels) were displayed on a CRT screen (100 
Hz refresh rate). The viewing distance was approximately 80 cm from the display monitor. From 
this distance, the 15 x 15 cm stimuli subtended 11o of visual angle. 
 
2.1.4. Data Analysis 
 
2.1.4.1. EEG Data Acquisition and Preprocessing 
 
Continuous EEG was acquired using HydroCel Geodesic Sensor Nets composed of 124 sensors 
(EGI, Eugene, OR, USA). Recordings were referenced to the vertex (Cz in the 10-20 system). The 
ground electrode was at the rear of the head (between Cz and Pz). The data were bandpass 
filtered online at 0.1-200 Hz and sampled at 500 Hz. Because infants sometimes look away from 
the display, the EEG data were first coded for visual attendance based on time-locked video 
recordings. All events (i.e., 1 object presentation and occlusion; 2 object reappearance after 
occlusion) during which infants did not attend to the screen were manually excluded from the 
analysis based on video inspection. Additionally, object reappearance events were excluded if 
infants did not look at the screen before occlusion because that rendered impossible encoding the 
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object and change detection. The continuous EEG was offline bandpass filtered at 0.3-100 Hz 
(following Parise & Csibra, 2012). Although filtering can distort the time course and amplitude of 
the ERP waveforms, such distortions typically occur when the low cut off exceeds 0.5 Hz or 
when the high cut off is below 10 Hz (Luck, 2014; Rousselet, 2012).  
 
2.1.4.2. Derivation of Event-Related Potentials 
 
The continuous EEG signal was segmented into 1700 ms epochs, beginning 200 ms before the 1st 
frame when the occluder started to go down (considered Time 0). Trials were sorted according to 
the occlusion outcome (i.e., no change, within-category change, or across-category change). 
Automatic artifact detection and visual inspection were applied to identify channels 
contaminated by noise: channels were automatically marked as bad if they contained eye 
movements (i.e., whenever the average amplitude of an 80 ms gliding window exceeded 55 !V 
at horizontal EOG channels or 140 !V at vertical EOG channels) or if they were contaminated by 
body movements (i.e., the average amplitude of an 80 ms gliding window exceeded 200 !V at 
any channel). Segments were automatically removed if they contained ocular artifacts or if more 
than 10% of the channels were contaminated by movement artifacts. For the remaining segments, 
bad channels were interpolated using spherical spline interpolation. For each participant, the 
data were then baseline-corrected to the first 200 ms of the segment, averaged for each trial type, 
and re-referenced to the average reference. Each infant was required to contribute at least 10 
trials to each condition to be included in the final analysis. As the Nc component is well 
described in time and space, we determined the specific cluster of electrodes and time window of 
analysis based on the prior findings showing a broad central to anterior distribution of the Nc 
(spanning between Cz and Fz, e.g., Reynolds & Richards, 2005; Richards, 2003) and computed the 
mean Nc amplitude using a cluster of electrodes covering central and anterior sites (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 104, 105, 106, 110, 111, 112, 117, 118, 124) 
between 350 and 800 ms following the reappearance of the object (i.e., relative to Time 0 of the 
segment). T tests below are two-tailed. Additionally, we report 95% confidence intervals (CI) for 
the difference in the mean of the dependent variable and Cohen's d for effect size. 
On average, infants contributed 13.2 (SD = 2.1) artifact-free segments (familiar-category 
condition: M = 13.3, SD = 2.5,  R = 10 to 19, no change: M = 13.7, SD = 2.5, within-category 
change: M = 13.71, SD = 2.8, across-category change: M = 13.1, SD = 2.4; unfamiliar-category 
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condition: M = 13, SD = 1.6, R = 10 to 17, no change: M = 13.1, SD = 1.8, within-category change: 
M = 13.2, SD = 1.5, across-category change: M = 12.8, SD = 1.7). There were no significant 
differences in the number of artefact-free segments between occlusion outcomes within- or 
across-conditions, all ps > .50. Therefore, signal-to-noise levels across conditions were similar.  
Similarly, no significant differences were recorded in the overall numbers of segments before 
artefact detection (all ps > .28; familiar-category condition: M = 23.9, SD = 3.8, R = 17 to 32, no 
change: M = 24.2, SD = 4.2, within-category change: M = 24.5, SD = 4.1, across-category change: 
M = 23.1, SD = 3.4; unfamiliar-category condition: M = 25.7, SD = 6.46, R = 13 to 39, no change: M 
= 26.5, SD = 7.3, within-category change: M = 25.5, SD = 5.8, across-category change: M = 25.2, 
SD = 6.7s). This indicates that infants presented with familiar and unfamiliar categories paid 
equal attention to the stimuli. 
 
 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
 
To assess infants’ sensitivity to object changes, we compared the Nc response to object 
reappearance on trials in which the identity of the objects was maintained throughout occlusion 
and trials on which it changed, across familiar and unfamiliar categories. The average Nc 
amplitudes were entered into a mixed-model ANOVA with occlusion outcome (no change v. 
within-category change v. across-category change) as a within-subject factor and condition 
(familiar category v. unfamiliar category) as a between-subject factor. This analysis yielded a 
significant main effect of outcome, F(2,44) = 21.583, p < .001, ηp2 = .50, and a significant interaction 
between outcome and condition, F(2,44) = 7.020, p = .002, ηp2 = .24. Infants in both conditions 
proved sensitive to object changes that occurred after occlusion (familiar-category condition: 
F(2,22) = 20.122, p < .001, ηp2 = .65; unfamiliar-category condition: F(2,22) = 9.233, p = .001, ηp2 = .46, 
as shown by separate repeated-measures ANOVAs within each category condition), but they 
reacted differently to within-category changes. Follow-up t tests revealed that infants who 
viewed familiar categories noticed across-category object changes, as evidenced by a more 
negative Nc response on across-category change trials than no-change trials, t(11) = 5.552, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [3.59, 8.31], d = 1.60, but they failed to display sensitivity to within-category object 
changes, as shown by the comparable responses on within-category change and no-change trials, 
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t(11) = .597, p = .562, 95% CI = [-1.27, 2.21], d = .17 (within-category v. across-category change 
trials, t(11) = 4.490, p < .001, 95% CI = [2.79, 8.16], d = 1.30). In contrast, infants presented with 
unfamiliar categories detected changes in objects’ identity regardless of whether the post-change 
object came from the same or a different category than the initial one. Compared to no change 
trials, their Nc was significantly more negative on both within-category change trials, t(11) = 
3.577,  p = .004, 95% CI = [1.63, 6.83], d = 1.03, and across-category change trials, t(11) = 3.260, p = 
.008, 95% CI = [1.33, 6.84], d = .94. There was no significant difference between within- and 
across-category object changes, t(11) = .163, p = .874, 95% CI = [-2.08, 1.80], d = .05.  
These results indicate that the response to within-category changes was affected by 
category knowledge. Infants who viewed familiar categories responded selectively to across-
category but not within-category object changes, while those who viewed unfamiliar categories 
responded reliably to both kinds of changes. The attenuated sensitivity to within-category 
changes occurring in objects drawn from familiar categories suggests that category knowledge 
impeded the representation of individual detail irrelevant for categorization. These results 
conceptually replicated previous behavioral findings (Kibbe & Leslie, 2019; Bonatti et al., 2002; 
Surian & Caldi, 2010; Xu, Carey, & Quint, 2004) and confirmed that categorical biases in object 
representation are manifest at the electrophysiological level. We could thus proceed to test 
whether nonverbal category knowledge alone would similarly modify infant object 
representation. 
Note, however, that although we sought to select items that, upon visual inspection, 
would be equally perceptually distinct from each other, the stimuli in the unfamiliar-category 
condition might have been more heterogeneous than in the familiar-category condition. Thus, 
the current pattern of results might have been due to the higher category discriminability within 
the unfamiliar compared to familiar categories. This issue was also addressed in Experiment 2. 
 
3. Experiment 2 
 
We first taught infants two novel categories without using category labels, and then assessed 
whether this newly acquired nonverbal category knowledge had an impact on their object 
representation. That is, the EEG task was preceded by a short lab-based category training 
(category-training condition) previously shown to induce category learning in young infants 
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(Gliga, Mareschal, & Johnson, 2008). To directly compare Experiments 1 and 2, and to confirm 
that the effects in Experiment 1 were due to category knowledge rather than physical 
characteristics of the stimuli (i.e., larger perceptual distance between category tokens in the 
unfamiliar categories boosting within-category change detection), we used the same visual 
stimuli as in the unfamiliar-category condition of Experiment 1. 
 




Twenty-four healthy monolingual infants from English-speaking homes took part in this 
experiment: 12 were assigned to the category-training condition (6 females, mean age = 12.64 mo, 
range: 12.29 to 13.03 mo) and 12 to the familiarization condition (5 females, mean age = 12.65 mo, 
range: 12.16 to 12.97 mo). A further 23 infants were tested but not included in the analysis 
because of fussiness (n = 5) or excessive movement resulting in an insufficient number of artifact-
free trials (n = 18). As in Experiment 1, families were recruited through advertising in local 
magazines, and their travel expenses were reimbursed. All caregivers gave written informed 
consent. Infants were rewarded with a certificate and a small gift. 
 
3.1.2. Stimuli, Design, and Procedure 
 
The EEG task of an identical structure as in Experiment 1 was directly preceded by a short 
behavioral procedure: category training or control (using the same visual stimuli and matched 
for exposure time, but not conducive to category learning), administered in a different 
experimental room than the EEG task. Because it is unknown whether infants at this age can 
readily learn more than two categories in a laboratory setting, we limited the number of taught 
categories to two. Individual infants were behaviourally trained and then tested in the EEG task 
on one of the following pairs: FEATHER & WATERING CAN, GUITAR & STAPLER, HEDGEHOG & 
PADLOCK. Each pair was presented to four participants from the final sample. Four additional 
photographs for each category, different than the ones used for the EEG recording, were used 
during the behavioral task. 
During category-training, infants watched videos of an experimenter sorting category 
exemplars (depicted on picture cards) into two locations based on their category membership 
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(e.g., watering cans placed to the left v. staplers placed to the right, forming two category-based 
homogenous object sets). In each trial, an actress was presented behind a table with two shelves, 
one on the right, containing three exemplars of category A, and one on the left, containing three 
exemplars of category B. First, the actress greeted the infant (“Hello baby!”) while waving and 
smiling at her. Then, she retrieved from behind the table a picture card representing a new 
category token, presented it to the infant saying “Look at this!”, placed it on one of the two 
shelves and remained immobile looking in the direction of the placed object (please see Figure 1 
for the final display). The actress always sorted the new picture in agreement with the category 
of the represented object, while the side of placement (left v. right) was counterbalanced. Images 
of the target items were glued onto black pieces of cardboard and used to make video stimuli. 
Trials were separated by a short centrally displayed attention getter. There were 4 trials per 
category, for a total of 8 videos. One trial lasted 15 seconds, for a total duration of the testing 
session of approximately 2 minutes. This training procedure, modeled on previous work in 
infant category learning (Gliga, Mareschal, & Johnson, 2008), was validated in a behavioral pilot 
using a looking-time violation-of-expectation test and administered to a separate group of 
participants (please see the Electronic Supplemental Material: ESM1. Category-training procedure. 
Task design and behavioral pilot data). 
Half of the infants participated in the category training. The other half received the same 
amount of exposure to the exemplars of novel categories, but in a manner not conducive to 
category formation (control condition, Pomiechowska & Gliga, 2019; Plunkett, Hu, & Cohen, 
2008): the experimenter sorted objects in a non-systematic way, producing two mixed-category 
object sets (each containing some instances of staplers and watering cans). The trial structure and 
timing were the same as in the category training, but each of the two shelves contained a mixed 
set of items from both categories. This condition was designed to control for the effects of 
prolonged perceptual exposure to unfamiliar objects.  
 
3.1.3. Data Analysis 
 
The EEG data were acquired and analyzed following the same processing and analysis steps as 
in Experiment 1. The same electrode cluster and time window were used for the Nc derivation. 
Overall, infants contributed 13. 7 (SD = 2.7) artefact-free segments (category training: M = 13.8, 
SD = 2.9, R = 10 to 21, no change: M = 14.2, SD = 3.5, within-category change: M = 13.8, SD = 2.4, 
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across-category change, M = 13.4, SD = 2.9;  control: M = 13.5, SD = 2.4,  R = 10 to 20, no change: 
M = 14.1, SD = 2.8, within-category change: M = 13.2, SD = 1.9, across-category change, M = 13.2, 
SD = 2.6). The number of artefact-free segments did not differ across occlusion outcomes within- 
and across-groups, all ps > 0.17, indicating a comparable signal-to-noise levels across conditions. 
The overall number of segments infants saw was comparable across occlusion outcomes (ps > 
.32), but varied across groups with infants in the category-training condition having seen on 
average more segments than infants in the control condition (p = . 004; category training: M = 
31.4, SD = 8.3, R = 11 to 45; no change: M = 31.8, SD = 8.2; within-category change: M = 31.5, SD = 
8.6; across-category change: M = 31.1, SD = 8.9; control: M = 22.4, SD = 5, R = 13 to 34, no change: 
M = 22.7, SD = 5.8, within-category change: M = 22.6, SD =4.8, across-category change: M = 23.1, 
SD = 4.4). This suggests that infants’ in this experiment sustained their attention to familiar 
categories for longer than to unfamiliar categories. 
All participants who provided enough artefact-free trials to be included in the final EEG 
sample watched the entirety of the category training or the matched control procedure 
administered before the EEG task. 
 
3.2. Results and Discussion 
 
As in Experiment 1, the average amplitudes of the Nc component elicited by object reappearance 
after occlusion were entered into a mixed-model ANOVA, with occlusion outcome (no change v. 
within-category change v. across-category change) as a within-subject factor and condition 
(category training vs. control condition) as a between-subject factor. This analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of outcome, F(2, 44) = 20.688, p < .001, ηp2 = .46, and a significant interaction 
between occlusion outcome and condition, F(2,44) = 8.770, p = .001, ηp2 = .29. This interaction was 
further explored by separate one-way ANOVAs within each condition, confirming that both 
infants who participated in the category training and those who participated in the control 
condition were sensitive to changes in occlusion outcomes (category-training condition: F(2,22) = 
15.375, p < .001, ηp2 = .58; control condition: F(2,22) = 13.973, p < .001, ηp2 = .56).  
The results of follow-up tests mirrored the results obtained in Experiment 1. Infants who 
learned nonverbal categories prior to the EEG task displayed sensitivity to across-category but 
not to within-category object changes, exhibiting the same pattern of Nc response as infants who 
acquired category knowledge prior to the lab visit. This was demonstrated by a significantly 
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more negative Nc on across-category change trials relative to no-change trials, t(11) = 4.030, p = 
.002, 95% CI = [2.16, 7.36], d = 1.16, or with-category change trials, t(11) = 5.409, p < .001, 95% CI = 
[2.80, 6.64], d = 1.56, and a comparable response on within-category change and no change trials, 
t(11) = .050,  p = .961, 95% CI = [-1.88, 1.97], d = .01. On the other hand, infants in the control 
condition, similarly to infants presented with unfamiliar categories in Experiment 1, detected 
both across-category and within-category object changes, as indicated by a significantly more 
negative Nc wave on across-change trials, t(11) = 4.292, p = .001, 95% CI = [1.89, 5.88], d = 1.68, 
and within-change trials, t(11) =  5.835, p < .001, 95% CI = [2.75, 6.09] d = 1.24, than on no change 
trials. Responses in both change conditions did not differ from each other, t(11) = .511, p = .620, 
95 % CI = [-2.85,1.78], d = .15.  
This pattern of responses indicates that in-lab induction of nonverbal category 
knowledge, but not mere visual experience with exemplars of unfamiliar categories, 
compromised within-category discrimination. The fact that infants in category-training and 
familiarization conditions viewed the same visual stimuli and differed only in their access to 
category knowledge demonstrates that their change-detection performance was not an artifact of 
our visual stimuli selection. Rather, upon learning nonverbal visual categories, infants selectively 
focused on the information related to category membership, seemingly leaving other information 
such as non-categorical visual features out. Importantly, this process took place in the absence of 
language. Thus, our results provide evidence that lexical knowledge is not necessary for the 
categorical biases to modulate visual object representations. The availability and recruitment of 
nonverbal category structures alone limits the number of visual features that are contained in 
object representation.  
 
3.3. Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2 
 
A mixed-model ANOVA with occlusion outcome (no change v. within-category change v. 
across-category change) as a within-subject factor, and category knowledge (familiar v. 
unfamiliar category) and experiment (Experiment 1 v. Experiment 2) as between-subject factors, 
revealed a significant main effect of outcome, F(2,88) = 42.120, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, and a significant 
interaction between outcome and category knowledge, F(2,88) = 15.448, p < .001, ηp2 = .26. The 
lack of a significant main effect of experiment, F(1,44) = 2.478, p = .123, ηp2 = .05, or significant 
interactions with this factor (all ps > .620) suggests that the presence of category knowledge, 
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whether long-term (Experiment 1) or newly acquired (Experiment 2), had the same effect on the 
infants’ sensitivity to object changes. Additionally, there was no evidence that simple visual 
exposure to unknown objects before the EEG test (Experiment 2) had an effect on the neural 
activity elicited by the unfamiliar categories. The data collapsed across experiments yielded the 
same patterns of results as the analyses within each experiment: within-category change 
detection was compromised for familiar categories, t(23) = 0.446, p = .660, 95% CI = [-.94, 1.45], d 
= .09, but not for unfamiliar categories, t(23) = 6.296, p < .001, 95% CI = [2.90, 5.74], d = 1.28, as 
revealed by the comparisons between within-category change and no change conditions. 
Conversely, sensitivity to across-category changes was manifest for both familiar categories, t(23) 
= 6.781, p < .001, d = 1.38, 95% CI = [3.72, 6.99], and unfamiliar categories, t(23) = 5.271, p < .001, d 
= 1.08, 95% CI = [2.42, 5.55], by comparisons to no change. 
 
4. Time course and nature of categorical biases on object representation 
 
While the Nc results provide evidence for modulatory effects of nonverbal category knowledge 
on object representation, they cannot indicate at what stage of object processing the categorical 
biases emerge and whether they affect only the selection of features stored in the representation 
or, additionally, the format of this representation. To address these questions, we analyzed 
event-related induced oscillatory activity in the gamma and alpha ranges. Gamma-band 
oscillations have been previously associated with object processing in human adults (Tallon-
Baudry, Kreiter, & Bertrand, 1999), human infants (Csibra et al., 2000; Kaufman, Csibra, & 
Johnson, 2003; 2005; Gliga, Volein, & Csibra, 2010; Southgate et al., 2008), and non-human 
animals (Lundqvist et al., 2016). Alpha-band oscillations have been argued to regulate working-
memory representations (de Vries, Slagter, & Olivers, 2020; Bonnefond & Jensen, 2012; Riddle et 
al., 2020). 
 
4.1. Time-Frequency Analysis 
 
The continuous EEG signal was segmented into 4700 ms epochs, beginning 1050 ms before the 
object started to be visible on the stage. Trials were sorted according to familiarity with the 
presented category (familiar vs. unfamiliar). We applied the same artifact and bad channel 
interpolation routine as in the ERP analysis. To compute induced event-related oscillations, we 
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followed an established routine (Csibra et al., 2000): the continuous wavelet transformation was 
applied to individual artifact-free epochs, using Morlet wavelets with 1-Hz resolution in the 
range of 5 to 60 Hz (EEGLAB, v. 9.0.5.6b; and EEGLAB-based scripts to perform the wavelet 
transform, available online, see Parise & Csibra, 2013). We took the absolute output value (i.e., 
the amplitude). Next, baseline-correction was performed by subtracting the average activity 
during 200 ms immediately preceding the object appearance (i.e., corresponding to the phase of 
the trial when the stage was empty) from the whole epoch at each frequency; 500 ms at the 
beginning and the end of each epoch were removed to eliminate the distortion created by the 
wavelet transform. Average wavelet coefficients within infants were calculated by taking the 
mean across trials for each time window and frequency band of interest.  
Time-frequency activation was averaged within two frequency ranges (gamma range: 25-
45 Hz, alpha range: 6-9 Hz) at two electrode sites over posterior temporal cortex (left: 58, 59, 64, 
65, 66, 69, 70; right: 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 95, 96), selected based on the literature (Gliga, Volein, & 
Csibra, 2010; Kaufman, Csibra, & Johnson, 2003, 2005; Kampis et al., 2015). The first time window 
corresponded to the full visibility of the target object (presentation phase: 300 to 1300 ms) and the 
second to its full occlusion (occlusion phase: 1650 to 2650 ms). All t tests reported below are two-
tailed. We also report 95% confidence intervals (CI) for the difference in the mean of the 
dependent variable and Cohen's d for effect size. 
There was no difference in the number of artefact-free trials contributed by the infants 
across conditions, with neither category knowledge (familiar v. unfamiliar), F(1,44) =.613, p = 
0.438, nor experiment (1 v. 2), F(1,44) =.316, p =.577, affecting the number of valid segments 
(familiar category in Experiment 1: M = 27, R = 10 to 57; unfamiliar category in Experiment 1: M 
= 22, R = 11 to 37; category training in Experiment 2: M = 23, R = 11 to 53; control in Experiment 
2: M = 23, R = 10 to 51). There was a significant interaction between experiment and category 
knowledge, F(1,44) = 16.309, p < .001, when we considered the overall numbers of segments 
infants saw, as assessed before the exclusion of trials contaminated by artefacts. There were no 
significant main effects of experiment, F(1,44) = .123, p = .727, or category, F(1,44) = 2.428, p = 
.126. In Experiment 1, infants in the familiar category condition saw a comparable amount of 
segments (M =  87, SD = 8) to those who watched unfamiliar categories (M = 99, SD = 20), p = 
.057. In Experiment 2, infants in the familiar category condition watched overall more segments 




4.2. Results and Discussion 
 
The results are depicted in Figure 3. The activations in the gamma and alpha ranges were entered 
into mixed-model ANOVAs with category knowledge (familiar v. unfamiliar) and experiment 
(Experiment 1 v. Experiment 2) as between-subject factors, phase (presentation v. occlusion), and 
hemisphere (left v. right) as within-subject factors.  
The ANOVA in the gamma range (25-45 Hz) revealed two effects that approached 
significance: an interaction between experiment, category and phase, F(1,44) = 2.818, p = .100, ηp2 = 
.06, and a main effect of category knowledge, F(1, 44) = 2.772, p = .106, ηp2 = .06. Because previous 
findings suggested that in 12-month-olds gamma-band activity might be an index of conceptual 
processing during visual inspection of familiar objects (Gliga, Volein, & Csibra, 2008), we carried 
out exploratory analyses to probe whether such modulation was manifest also in the present 
data. Separate ANOVAs with category knowledge and experiment were conducted within each 
phase (presentation v. occlusion). The data were collapsed across the bilateral clusters of 
electrodes, as there was no significant main effect of hemisphere nor any interaction with this 
factor (all ps > .231). During the presentation, gamma synchrony was only modulated by 
category knowledge, F(1,44) = 4.520, p = .039, ηp2 = .09, with familiar categories eliciting higher 
activation than the unfamiliar ones. Comparisons to baseline revealed that only the response to 
familiar categories raised significantly above baseline, t(23) = 3.754, p = .001, d = .77, 95% CI = 
[.03, .12], unfamiliar categories: t(23) = .562, p = .579, d = .11, 95% CI = [-.03, .06]. This pattern of 
activation replicates previous findings that linked this frequency band to conceptual processing 
of familiar categories in young infants (Gliga, Volein, & Csibra, 2010) and are consistent with the 
idea that category knowledge had an impact on object representation already at the stage of 
information encoding. Future research should further validate this possibility. The ANOVA on 
the occlusion data did not reveal any significant effects (all ps > 0.350). 
The omnibus ANOVA in the alpha range (6-9 Hz) yielded a significant main effect of 
phase, F(1,44) = 19.557, p < .001, ηp2 = .31, and a significant interaction between category 
knowledge, experiment, hemisphere, and phase, F(1,44) = 4.584, p = .038, ηp2 = .09. To resolve this 
interaction, we conducted separate ANOVAs within each phase, with category knowledge 
(familiar v. unfamiliar) and experiment (Experiment 1 v. Experiment 2) as between-subject 
factors, and hemisphere (left v. right) as a within-subject factor. The ANOVA on the presentation 
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data yielded no significant effects (all ps > .189). A comparison to baseline performed on the data 
collapsed across categories, hemispheres, and experiments revealed that the alpha activation was 
suppressed, that is significantly lower than at baseline, t(47) = 5.213, p < .001, d = 0.75 95% CI = [-
.43, -.19]. The ANOVA on the occlusion data yielded a significant main effect of category, F(44) = 
4.356, p = .043, ηp2 =.09 . Because the main effect of hemisphere only approached significance, 
F(44) = 4.016, p = .051, ηp2 = .08, we collapsed the data across hemispheres for further 
comparisons. A release from suppression was observed during occlusion of the objects from 
familiar categories: the occlusion alpha in the familiar category conditions did not differ from 
baseline, t(23) = .065, p = .945, 95% CI = [-.20, .19]. In contrast, the activity elicited by the 
occlusion of objects from unfamiliar categories remained significantly below baseline, t(23) = 
3.190, p = .004, d = .65, 95% CI = [-.45, -.09]. Exploratory analyses performed on the data split by 
hemisphere yielded the same pattern of results. This suggests that different information 
maintenance strategies were recruited for familiar versus unfamiliar categories, likely due to 
distinct representational formats employed by the infants to deal with the storage of categorized 
versus non-categorized information. On the one hand, the temporal alpha suppression observed 
in unfamiliar categories suggests that in the absence of categorization, ventral pathways were 
involved in the maintenance of sensory information. On the other hand, the release from 
suppression observed in familiar categories might indicate top-down inhibitory control over 
visual processing (Klimesch, 2012). These distinct patterns of alpha-band activity recorded in 
responses to familiar and unfamiliar categories during occlusion are in line with findings that 
inferior temporal cortices are involved in the sensory processing of visual stimuli, while 
categorical information is processed in the pre-frontal cortex (Freedman et al., 2001; 2003). They 
also constitute preliminary evidence for the idea that categorization might lead infants to use 
proto-symbolic representations centered around category symbols (Pomiechowska et al., in 
press; Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015) and devoid of episodic information (Kibbe & Leslie, 2019; 
Xu, Quint, & Carey, 2004).  
 
5. General Discussion 
 
Numerous convergent findings indicate that categorical information is privileged in 
object processing and representation throughout the lifespan. One fundamental question 
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regarding these categorical biases is whether they derive from lexical symbols used to 
communicate about objects and categories, or whether they are a product of nonverbal category 
structures that precede lexical-semantic knowledge in phylogeny and ontogeny. Our results 
provide empirical support for the latter view. Across two experiments using an EEG change-
detection task in preverbal human infants, we observed a striking dissociation between the way 
12-month-olds processed objects from familiar and unfamiliar categories, which cannot be 
accounted for by their knowledge of category labels.  
First, we established that infants' object representations contain a large amount of featural 
detail unless filtered through category knowledge. Twelve-month-olds reliably detected when an 
object was replaced by another object from a different category following a brief occlusion, 
irrespective of whether these objects represented familiar or unfamiliar categories. This was 
evidenced by their Nc responses to object reappearance, with a larger Nc amplitude recorded to 
across-category object changes than to the reappearance of the object that was initially occluded. 
In contrast, when an object was replaced by a different object from the same category, only 
infants presented with unfamiliar categories displayed sensitivity to the change. That is, infants 
who viewed unfamiliar categories showed a more negative Nc to within-category object changes 
than to no change events, unlike infants who viewed familiar categories and whose Nc did not 
differentiate between these conditions. This asymmetry in within-category change detection 
confirms that category knowledge influences the information included by the infants in their 
object representations. More specifically, category knowledge interfered with the infants' ability 
to represent individual-specific detail, otherwise readily encoded in its absence. Diverging 
patterns of oscillatory activity elicited by familiar and unfamiliar categories before and during 
occlusion suggest that infants rapidly categorized the familiar objects, and categorical 
information become the core content of the representations they set up.  
Second, we demonstrated the recorded representational changes were triggered by 
nonverbal category knowledge and independent from language. More specifically, in 
Experiment 1, we showed that the bias to disregard individual featural details occurred naturally 
when children observed categories learned outside the lab. In Experiment 2, we established that 
this bias could be rapidly induced by learning new nonverbal categories. This finding confirmed 
that the recorded categorical modulation of object representation was not reliant on language. 
Moreover, we found no differences in the patterns of the ERP or oscillatory responses between 
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potentially lexicalized categories acquired in real-life circumstances and nonverbal categories 
trained in the lab. This suggests that, in both experiments, infants probably relied on nonverbal 
category representations.  
Note that we ruled out low-level perceptual explanations for the infants' responses. We 
used the same task and the same unfamiliar stimuli across three conditions (unfamiliar 
categories in Experiment 1, category training in Experiment 2, and control in Experiment 2) and 
manipulated only the infants' ability to categorize them. Hence, our findings indicate that within-
category object changes became challenging to notice as a result of learning the relevant category 
knowledge, and not due to differences in stimulus characteristics or exposure times.  
What is the nature of the representations that infants set up to track objects? Do they 
recruit the same representational formats for objects from familiar versus unfamiliar categories? 
In principle, mid-level visual representations such as object files (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 
1992; Leslie, Xu, Tremoulet, & Scholl, 1998) could be employed in both cases, with bundles of 
different features bound to them depending on whether the object at hand comes from a familiar 
or unfamiliar category. Category-diagnostic features could be encoded for familiar categories, 
while the selection of features would be less constrained for unfamiliar categories, resulting in a 
random sampling of category-relevant and irrelevant information. Alternatively, however, 
category knowledge might lead to a qualitative shift towards symbolic representation. By using 
nonlexicalized categories, we excluded the possibility that infants relied on labels as object 
placeholders, but they might be using non-verbal symbols indexing familiar categories 
(Pomiechowska et al., in press; Csibra and Shamsudheen, 2015). This model is supported by the 
patterns of oscillatory alpha activity recorded during occlusion of the probe objects, indicating a 
differential response to objects from familiar versus unfamiliar categories. More specifically, 
temporal alpha suppression sustained during occlusion of unfamiliar but not familiar objects 
suggests that sensory featural information was selectively maintained only in the absence of 
category knowledge. The results of exploratory analyses of gamma synchrony also support this 
idea and call for future research to further corroborate it: the increased activation during 
presentation of familiar objects might index a rapid recruitment of conceptual symbolic 
representations carried out upon visual inspection of the familiar objects. 
Our findings directly contribute to the debate on how visual working memory develops. 
Previous work indicates that by 6 months of age, infants readily represent up to two hidden 
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objects (Wynn, 1992) and store certain categorical information characterizing them (e.g., object v. 
agent: (Kibbe & Leslie, 2019). On the contrary, their ability to remember surface features lags 
behind (Kaldy & Leslie, 2005; Kibbe & Leslie, 2011; Southgate et al., 2008), gradually improving 
until one year of age (Kibbe & Leslie, 2013; Wilcox, 1999) and perhaps beyond. The past work has 
also shown that the storage capacity of infants’ working memory is modulated by various factors 
(e.g., the number of objects to remember, Kibbe & Leslie, 2013; the time elapsed from hiding, e.g., 
Káldy & Leslie, 2005; Kibbe & Leslie, 2016). In particular, Kibbe and Leslie have recently 
demonstrated that conceptual knowledge can increase the number of objects that 6-month-olds 
can remember (Kibbe & Leslie, 2019; see also, Feigenson & Halberda, 2008; Rosenberg & 
Feigenson, 2013). Our findings confirm that older infants can spontaneously encode objects in 
great detail and this encoding is influenced by category knowledge. Importantly, however, 
unlike in the previous work, we show that categorization appears to decrease the amount of 
information stored. We believe that although these observations might seem contradictory, they 
stem from the same underlying process and can provide a further insight into the role that 
category knowledge might play in working memory. Namely, category knowledge does not 
simply increase the storage capacity but provides a summary representational format (e.g., 
category tag or symbol devoid of individual featural information in the same manner as a 
category label, see also Pomiechowska et al., in press) that allows for information compression 
and is used by infants to encode and maintain the information. Arguably, this format facilitates 
setting up and maintaining distinct representations of objects from different categories that fall 
under different category tags (e.g., baby v. ball, Kibbe & Leslie, 2019) and may lead to a higher 
number of such representations to be maintained in memory. At the same time, it appears to 
compromise the discriminability between individual items from the same category that all fall 
under the same category tag (e.g., ball 1 v. ball 2, Experiment 1; see also Xu, Carey, & Quint, 
2004).  
Another interesting question is whether categorical object representation that hinders 
featural encoding arises naturally whenever infants visually inspect an object or has been 
induced by the nature of our task that involved storing object representations in working 
memory. Recent research suggests that infants do not spontaneously think of objects in terms of 
their categories but do so only when required by the nature of the task they are involved in 
(Pomiechowska et al., in press). For example, twelve-month-olds have been shown to represent 
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familiar objects under relevant category descriptions when interpreting nonverbal 
communication while at the same time failing to do so in a noncommunicative context. It was 
argued that this was because interpreting communication triggers the addressee to represent the 
referent under a conceptual description that is required to make inferences about meaning. It is a 
possibility that infants in the current task resorted to category-based representations because this 
representational format is triggered by the demand to maintain information in the working 
memory.  
Functionally, prioritizing category- over featural information might facilitate the 
acquisition of semantic knowledge, especially needed when linguistic tools of reference 
disambiguation are unavailable. In particular, before language develops, biases to prioritize 
category-level representations may ensure that infants map new information directly to 
categories and not to individuals (Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015). The knowledge mapped onto a 
categorical representation can be directly extended and applied to any individual recognized as 
an exemplar of the category in question. Under this description, categorical biases in object 
representation may constitute a mechanism of knowledge generalization ready for use before 
children come to understand generic language. Such a mechanism could even be helpful in word 
learning. That is, a word learner biased to build categorical representations of encountered 
objects would automatically link a novel word (e.g., a common noun “apple) encountered in the 
presence of a specific object to its categorical properties, which, in turn, would enable her to 
accurately extend it to other objects falling in the same category (e.g., the word “apple” would 
automatically apply not only to the particular apple that was named but to all members of the 
same non-linguistic category). Recent research suggests that twelve-month-olds might indeed 
rely on such strategies of word generalization (Pomiechowska & Gliga, 2019, see also Yin & 
Csibra 2015 for older infants).  
We acknowledge that our results do not rule out the possibility that further modulations 
of object representation may stem from experience with language. Although specific concepts are 
differently instantiated in each individual mind (Barrett, 2015) (e.g., one's concept of dog will 
likely be different from that of a veterinary surgeon), we all employ the same category labels in 
communication, whether to indicate kind membership (e.g., “this is a dog”), convey generic 
information (e.g., "dogs chase cats") or transient individual-specific information (e.g., "my dog is 
playing in the yard"). Thus, the use of linguistic symbols that call for category-level 
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representation may further influence the representational structures recruited by object cognition 
and their contents by virtue of reinforcing the neural connections between labels and category-
diagnostic features. In line with this idea, it has been shown that access to category names 
enhances visual discrimination in match-to-sample tasks (Winawer et al., 2007) and complex 
visual search contexts (Lupyan & Spivey, 2008). On the other hand, natural languages also have 
tools for communicating about particular individuals (e.g., proper names: Marie Curie, Paris), 
which have been shown to increase attention to individual-specific features (Pickron et al., 2018). 
It, thus, seems that some linguistic devices (such as proper names) may further increase 
sensitivity to the distinctiveness of visual stimuli, while others (such as category labels) decrease 
it. Whether the latter is simply due to improved categorization performance that enables pre-
existing categorical biases to operate or involves independent language-specific computational 
mechanisms remains to be determined by future research. 
To conclude, already in infancy, object representation is not merely a direct function of 
the features available in perception but is determined by the available category knowledge. 
Critically, the availability of nonverbal visual categories is sufficient to modulate the contents of 
object representations by preventing the storage of individual surface features. Hence, at least 
some forms categorical biases in object cognition are independent of natural language. 
Nonverbal symbolic representations might be the basis of generic knowledge transmission and 
serve as a foundation on which further linguistic modulation of object representation develops. 
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Figure 1. Schematic of experimental design. A EEG change-detection task. In the EEG change-detection task 
employed across Experiments 1-2, infants watched a series of briefly occluded objects. One of the three 
outcomes was presented after occlusion: (i) no change to the object that was occluded, (ii) within-category 
change with a novel item of the same category replacing the initial object, (iii) across-category change with a 
novel item from a different category replacing the initial object. We varied whether infants watched familiar or 
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unfamiliar categories. B Schematic of Experiment 1. Two groups of infants participated in the EEG task: 
infants in one group watched objects from familiar categories learnt prior to the lab visit and infants in the 
other group watched objects from unfamiliar categories. C Schematic of Experiment 2. The EEG task was 
preceded by a behavioural task: one group of infants participated in a nonverbal category training, while the 
other group was shown the same visual stimuli in a manner not conducive to category formation (control 
condition). The final frame of trials used in respective behavioral tasks is presented in the display. The same 
picture stimuli were used as in the unfamiliar category condition of Experiment 1, hence the only difference 
between groups was the category knowledge induced in the behavioural task. D Time-course of an EEG trial. 








Figure 2. Infants’ change-detection performance in Experiments 1-2. A Grand-average waveforms represent 
the Nc component in response to the object’s reappearance after occlusion on no-change trials (blue), within-
category change trials (red), and across-category change trials (black). The grey shading indicates the time 
window of the analysis (350–800 ms). The vertical grey line marks the time at which the object became first 
visible after occlusion. B Average Nc amplitude across object-change conditions. Yellow squares indicate 
means. Black horizontal lines indicate medians. The bottom and the top of the boxes represent the first and the 
third quartiles. Whiskers extend from the middle quartiles to the smallest and largest values within 1.5 times 
the interquartile range. Dots represent individual data points. C Event-related potential topographies over 
trial time for each object-change condition (N: no-change, W: within-category change, A: across-category 
change) and their difference (W-N: within-category change minus no change; A-N: across-category change 








Figure 3. Oscillatory activity during object presentation and occlusion in Experiments 1-2: (A, B) gamma 
range (C, D) alpha range. For visualization purposes, the data were split by experiment. The zero point on the 
time axis indicates the first frame when the object started to be visible. A Time-frequency plots represent the 
changes in the time course of high-frequency oscillations (20-55 Hz) during object presentation (A1) and 
occlusion (A2), depicting mean baseline-corrected activity averaged across bilateral clusters of electrodes. The 
dotted areas indicate the time windows (A1: presentation, i.e., object fully visible between 300-1300 ms relative 
to the zero point, A2: occlusion, i.e., object fully invisible between 1650-2650 ms relative to the zero point) and 
the frequency range used for the analysis (gamma: 25-45 Hz). B Bar plots and boxplots represent mean 
oscillatory activity in the target frequency range during presentation and occlusion averaged across bilateral 
clusters of electrodes. Dots represent individual data points. C Time-frequency plots represent the changes in 
the time-course of low-frequency oscillations (3-20 Hz) during object presentation (C1) and occlusion (C2), 
depicting mean baseline-corrected activity averaged across bilateral clusters of electrodes. The dotted areas 
indicate the time windows and the frequency range used for the analysis (alpha: 6-9 Hz). D Bar plots and 
boxplots represent mean oscillatory activity in the target frequency range during presentation and occlusion. 
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